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THE DONALD A. GIANNELLA MEMORIAL LECTURES are a
unique foundation in American legal scholarship. Many law
schools possess endowed lectureships named after the alumnus who
put up the money, or named after some eminent outsider - judge or
practicing lawyer - whom the donors wished to commemorate. My
own law school, Columbia, has its renowed Carpentier Lectures, but
I have no idea who Mr. Carpentier was, unless he was the gallant
underweight Frenchman who once lasted four rounds with Jack
Dempsey. Only at Villanova, as far as I know, is there a lectureship
honoring the memory of one of the Law Faculty's own. At Villanova,
it seems, a prophet - even one who died tragically young and just as
he had come into the fullness of his powers - is not without honor in
his own country. I am deeply honored to have been allowed to take
part in the first of what will be, in future years at least, a
distinguished series of lectures honoring a great law professor and
superb human being.
Donald Giannella was much younger than I, which makes his
loss harder to bear, but we had a whole bundle of shared interests
and, I like to think, common values. We had planned one day to
collaborate on a casebook on Church-State Relations in the United
States; Giannella and Jones on Church and State had, we thought, a
nice ecumenical ring to it. And we were both interested in problems
of law and morality, not because either of us fancied himself as a lay
preacher, but because we had both learned by experience that law
cannot be seriously studied or taught without getting into difficult
questions of morality, right conduct and justice.
Law and morality can be kept entirely and antiseptically
separate only by a closet legal philospher who is wilfully blind to
* This article was prepared from the first Donald A. Giannella Memorial
Lecture of the Villanova University School of Law, September 30, 1976. The lecture
has been supplemented by documentation and edited where necessary to accommo-
date the written form.
t Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University School of Law.
LL.B., Washington University School of Law, 1934; L.H.D., Villanova University
School of Law, 1967.
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legal reality. For law is not something to be contemplated from
without, as one might study astronomy or primitive anthropology.
What counts is not what a law student knows abstractly but what he
can do with what he knows in the accomplishment of practical
professional tasks. And one cannot ask a reflective student what he
can do with a line of cases, a statute or a counseling situation
without that student's asking, if only to himself, whether what he
can do as a matter of positive law is an ethically right thing to do.
The practice of law has many of the attributes of a contest, often a
hard-fought contest, but there are some occasions when it has to be
more than a game, when the lawyer must ask himself whether he is
putting his knowledge and special professional skills to the service
or disservice of justice in human affairs.
I hope that this lecture will not seem moralistic or gratuitously
pious. If it does, it will be a very poor tribute to the memory of
Donald Giannella, who was a profoundly good man with a sharp
sense of humor and proportion and without a trace of self-
righteousness or moral condescension in his make-up. I shall be
serious, but I hope the going will not be too heavy, as lectures on
legal ethics have a way of being. And why should I be unduly
solemn on this occasion honoring Donald Giannella, whom I always
found it a delight to be with and whom I remember with gratitude
and joy? And now, as I must, I shift the theme from my friend to my
subject, lawyers and Justice: The Uneasy Ethics of Partisanship.
II.
The Watergate affair was a painful moment of truth for the
American legal profession. Never before in human history had so
many accredited members of one learned profession been involved in
a conspiracy to undermine a great nation's political institutions. The
egregious picklock, Gordon Liddy, the ultimate informer, John Dean,
the asinine prankster, Donald Segretti, and the heavy-handed
attorney general, John Mitchell, were very different people and
occupied vastly different positions in public life. But they had one
thing in common. They were all - God help us - officers of the
court, certified members of the bar.
This was a dreadful realization for those of us who have long
believed, as Holmes did, that the study and practice of the law
cannot but make a good man better and make even a bad man a
little less awful than he would otherwise be. Something had gone
wrong in the profession that had provided the ideological leadership
of the American Revolution and had been hailed by de Toqueville as
the truly aristocratic element of democracy in America. And,
958 [VOL. 23: p. 597
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something having gone gravely wrong, the organized bar concluded,
as it usually does, that the fault must lie in the university law
schools. I sometimes think that if a station wagon full of
conventioning lawyers drove off a bridge and into the Schuylkill
River, the bar associations would pass a resolution condemning
Villanova and the other Pennsylvania law schools for not offering a
required course in driver education.
In any event, in the post-Watergate summer of 1974, the
American Bar Association (ABA) amended its legal education
standards to add a mandatory provision that all accredited law
schools must "offer and require for all students .. .instruction in
the duties and responsibilities of the legal profession," which covers
"the history, goals, structure and responsibility of the legal
profession and its members, including the Code of Professional
Responsibility of the American Bar Association . . .-
As our profession's principal response to Watergate, the
amended standard leaves a good bit to be desired. The political and
social morality of John Ehrlichman or John Mitchell would have
been improved by study of the Code of Professional Responsibility
about as much, I fear, as study of Robert Louis Stevenson's Essay on
Sportsmanship would improve the tennis court behavior of Ilye
Nastase. But whether or not it was relevant to the occasion that
brought it forth, I warmly welcome the insistence of the organized
bar that the duties of the profession, and specifically the Code of
Professional Responsibility, be required as an integral part of
university law study.
I have two reasons for being happy about this 1974 intervention
of the organized bar. The first reason is that it will put the emphasis
in one course, at least, on lawyers' operations as distinguished from
law in the books, on what lawyers do and can do with legal sources
in courts and law offices as distinguished from what cases, statutes
and other legal sources may mean in some universe of pure legal
theory. We can stand a little less abstract theorizing in our law
schools about the supposed "true" import of appellate decisions and
can profit from a little more schooling in the realities of the lawyer's
functioning. Whatever else may or may not be accomplished by law
school instruction in "the duties and responsibilities of the legal
profession," the byproduct cannot but be a clearer awareness on the
part of law students that law is not only what courts and legislatures
say, but also, in its retail phases, what lawyers do. Those of you who
1. See also Clark, Teaching Professional Ethics, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249, 259
(1975); Weinstein, Educating Ethical Lawyers, 47 N.Y.B.J. 260, 308 (1975).
1977-1978]
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ever took a course with him have heard this before, and better, from
Donald Giannella.
There is a second gain, one perhaps not anticipated, nor even
very much desired by the earnest practicing lawyers who brought in
the 1974 amendment to the ABA educational standards: the new
requirement has already caused, and will increasingly cause, the
Code of Professional Responsibility itself to be examined more
carefully and appraised more critically than could otherwise have
possibly occurred. As every law teacher knows, there is nothing
sacred to law students about the positive law. No legal or law-related
text can be presented dogmatically - its policy assumptions taken
for granted and dutifully accepted - to the bright and properly
questioning members of a law school class. The Code of Professional
Responsibility is now in for the kind of scrutiny and unbiased
fundamental appraisal that university law study has given for years
to the antitrust laws, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Internal Revenue Code, and even the Constitution of the United
States and the decisions by which the Supreme Court has
determined its meaning for our own day.
When so appraised by the critical complement of law students
and their teachers, the Code of Professional Responsibility emerges,
I think, with this rating: "A good try, but not really good enough." It
is a good try because the able and conscientious people who
participated in the drafting of the Code between 1964 and 1969 came
up with something far better than the antique document the Code
replaced, the Canons of Professional Ethics, which had stood largely
unchanged since 1908. The improvements are many and various:
more sensitive and useful treatment of one of the lawyer's most
pervasive problems - avoiding conflicts of interest; far greater
emphasis on the bar's responsibility for the delivery of legal services
to persons of limited or moderate means; and acceptance of the idea
that competence and diligence, equally with fiscal honesty, are
ethical obligations owed by lawyers to their clients.
Yet, and however reluctantly, we have to say "not really good
enough," because the Code of Professional Responsibility fails
painfully in two major respects. First, it is still a barrister's code,
focused far too much on the ethical problems that arise in courtroom
advocacy and giving much sketchier guidance on what matters more
to most lawyers - the ethical problems that arise in a lawyer's
work as counselor, draftsman and engineer of transactions. And,
second, the Code does not really come to grips with the deeper
questions raised by what the profession has long taken for granted,
the moral and social ambiguities, contradictions and strains of the
ethics of partisanship, with whether the lawyer, as a moral man,
[VOL. 23: p. 597
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may - perhaps even is under an obligation to - do for his clients
what he would not think it right and just to do in his own interest. It
is to these two shortcomings of the Code that I shall address myself,
not that I have final answers to offer - for that is not my way any
more than it was Donald Giannella's - but because I believe the
questions to be central and inevitable in the functioning of the legal
profession, and so in the life of every thoughtful and morally
responsible lawyer.
III.
This is a university lecture, not a prayer breakfast. If it were a
prayer breakfast, the odds are pretty good that our speaker would be
another Watergate law alumnus - now happily and evangelistically
rehabilitated - Mr. Charles Colson. Mr. Colson, before he saw the
burning bush somewhere on his way to or from 1600 Pennsylvania
Avenue, liked to say that he would run over his grandmother if that
would insure the reelection of Richard Nixon. I do not know Mr.
Colson's grandmother, who may be a fussy old party and may even
have been a secret admirer of Edmund Muskie or Nelson Rockefeller.
Nor do I presume to question the completeness of Mr. Colson's moral
rebirth, although there are those who have a certain lingering
feeling that Grandmother Colson would still be well advised to stay
strictly indoors when Mr. Colson is at the wheel of his car. But Mr.
Colson's preconversion remark, however hyperbolic and wryly
intended, reflects the creed of the absolute partisan, who knows but
one loyalty - to his employer - and the devil with everything and
everybody else. This, we can all readily agree, is too much. And what
we deplore in Mr. Colson we can certainly not applaud in the
advocate or counselor, whatever the controversy or cause in which
he is engaged. There must be some limit on the adversary obligation;
absolute partisanship is the ethic of a fanatic. Even trial by battle
was never waged on the principle, or antiprinciple, of no-holds-
barred.
We have, then, narrowed our area of possible disagreement. Let
us see if we can narrow it a little more. Mr. Colson is or was an
accredited member of the legal profession, but - unlike Mr. St. Clair
later on - Mr. Colson was not acting in his capacity as a lawyer in
his relations with Mr. Nixon. Nevertheless, a disquieting question
comes to mind: Was Mr. Colson's unbridled zeal for his political
superior essentially an unreflective carry-over of the traditionally
political context of the legal profession to the partisan ethos?
Suppose that Mr. Colson had been acting, not as a White House
operative, but as a lawyer and that Mr. Nixon had not been
President but an ordinary client - even an extraordinary client like
1977-1978]
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Howard Hughes or Emily Harris or Lockheed Aircraft. To what
lengths would Mr. Colson have been justified in going, by the
accepted ethics of the profession, to secure that client's success in
litigation or to guarantee the achievement - out of court - of some
commercial or social end strongly sought by the client but of
manifest disadvantage to society? If unbridled partisanship, single-
minded and no-(or few-) holds-barred, is unacceptable in the other
affairs of life, is it acceptable in the context of the lawyer's
professional functioning?
IV.
I have called this lecture "The Uneasy Ethics of Partisanship,"
so we shall now part company with Mr. Colson. Mr. Colson, before
he saw the light, seems not to have been a very good man, and there
are few moments of ethical uneasiness in the life of a morally
insensitive person. It is better for our purposes that we take a good
man as our example. I will take one of the best men I have ever
known, my Sunday School teacher of many years ago, who was at
once a vastly successful practicing lawyer and a person of stiffly
uncompromising personal rectitude, whom I admired and whose
memory I still revere. His initials were J.M.L., and I shall so refer to
him for the rest of this lecture. How would he have accommodated
his keen sense of justice to the partisan ethics of the profession he
thought of as his life's vocation? Now we get down to cases:
Case One
A longtime client of J.M.L.'s asks him to undertake the defense
of the client's black-sheep son, who has been indicted for commission
of a brutal and violent crime. J.M.L. knows to a moral certainty -
no matter how he knows - that the son is guilty and is, moreover, a
menace to society as long as he remains at large. Will J.M.L. take
the case? Of course he will - and should. But, having taken the
case, will he try to get the defendant off even if this involves the
concealment of incriminating evidence or casting the shadow of
guilt on someone else? If there is an easy answer to this, I do not
know what it is.
Case Two
One of J.M.L.'s clients is sued for nonpayment of a just debt that
happens to be barred by the statute of limitations, the Statute of
Frauds or some intricacy of the Parole Evidence Rule. If this were
J.M.L.'s own debt, he would pay it without the slightest hesitation.
[VOL. 23: p. 597
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Is his course to be different in his client's interest?2 A lawyer may, as
J.M.L. certainly would, urge his client to honor the unenforceable
obligation; the Code of Professional Responsibility suggests this as a
possible course of action,3 although not as enthusiastically as it
might. But if the client insists that the technical defense be raised, is
the lawyer under a duty to raise it? It would seem that he is. The
Code of Professional Responsibility says that "the lawyer should
always remember that the decision whether to forego legally
available objectives or methods because of nonlegal factors [like
justice and honor and fair play?] is ultimately for the client and not
for himself."'4 This is the adversary ethic at work; if the client is deaf
to the plea of justice, he is entitled to all the law will give him, and
the advocate is obliged to help him get it. I think this is probably the
correct answer, but still I wonder. And I hope that some of you .are
wondering, too.
Case Three
This problem takes J.M.L., fine lawyer and truly good man, out
of the adversary context and places him behind his office desk as
counselor and advisor. A major corporate client, whom he serves on
retainer, is concerned about possible claims from its distributors and
customers and wants something put into its standard form contracts
to insulate the company from possible liability, even for losses
caused by the company's own negligence, default or neglect. The
corporation is a big fellow in its industry; the standard form contract
will be offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and the smaller
distributors and consumers will have no alternative but to take it.
J.M.L. would never for a moment think of putting such an
oppressive clause into a contract of his own. Do the accepted ethical
standards of the legal profession instruct or authorize him to do for
his client what he would never do for himself? Should he be troubled
in conscience if he drafts the requested insulation clause with
technical precision, so as to make it legally enforceable, and, by
2. 1 used to think of this as a simple problem in professional obligation, but
discussions with generations of first-year Contracts students have shown me how
hard a problem it actually is.
3. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-8 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as C.P.R.]. Ethical Consideration 7-8 provides in part:
In assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer
to point out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as
well as legally permissible. He may emphasize the possibility of harsh
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including it in the client's standard contract, imposes it on every
small businessman with whom the client deals?
This case is, for me at least, the hardest one of the three. Is the
postulated situation fanciful, something beyond the counselor's
likely experience with the sharp practice of clients? Writing of the
"ruthless practices" of the first John D. Rockefeller, of his "use of
threats, his ability to make competitors 'sweat,' and his willingness
to employ strong arm tactics," the eminent historian, Daniel J.
Boorstin, made this observation: "The best lawyers of his day, men
of the highest legal ethics, were employed by Rockefeller to devise
his most dubious tactics." "Men of the highest legal ethics?" If so -
and it may be so - legal ethics is an exotic and very different plant
in the garden of morality. There must be some point, short of
running over one's grandmother, at which the lawyer's own personal
and social morality will rebel against his traditional allegiance to
his client. My revered mentor, J.M.L., unquestionably drew the line
somewhere. Where is it drawn in the code of Professional Responsi-
bility? Search that Code as I have, I have not come up with an
acceptable answer.
Given equal time for rebuttal, a thoughtful practicing lawyer
would undoubtedly point out that these three hypothetical cases put
the issues more bleakly, with less shading, than they are likely to be
on most occasions in the life of the lawyer. This I readily concede.
For one thing, I have been speculating as to the probable ethical
uneasiness of my onetime teacher, J.M.L., who was an extraordinarr
ily good man. Most lawyers, I think, are certainly more sensitive in
their personal ethics and perceptions of justice than the mine-run of
humanity, but even most lawyers are not as truly virtuous as J.M.L.
and, therefore, not likely to feel the pangs of ethical uneasiness as
sharply as he. You will also have noted that Case One assumes
J.M.L.'s actual knowledge that his client was guilty of the violent
crime of which he was accused. Lawyers in reality are unlikely to
have such certain knowledge - in fact, they do their best to avoid
having it thrust upon them - and a lawyer's impression of his
client's guilt or innocence can change in the course of, case
preparation and even at trial. And in Case Two and Case Three, I
have assumed that the justice of the matter is all on the opposing
side, whereas in most litigation and counseling situations, the
shading is subtler and the line between right and wrong less clear,
particularly after the lawyer begins to identify with his client and
the psychology of partisanship sets in. But the problems I have
5. D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 51 (1973).
[VOL. 23: p. 597964
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given, although not characteristic of all the lawyer's ethical
situations, are characteristic of some of them. And, these are the
cases that challenge the traditional ethics of the profession,
certainly in the minds of outsiders and, I think, even more
significantly in the minds and consciences of lawyers themselves.
In our profession, we have for too long taken the partisan ethic
as something given and beyond question, as if it were revealed or
self-evident truth. It is time to rethink this ethic, at least in some of
its applications. My quarrel with the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility is not at all that it does not abandon the partisan ethic - it
may or not be time for that - but that it reaffirms that ethic, both
for advocacy and for counseling, without ever reexamining it on its
merits. Some "zero budgeting" was in order when the Code was
drawn up, but professional organizations, like government agencies,
are slow to question what has long been taken for granted.
V.
One always has to be selective in a short lecture. In the
remainder of this lecture, I have decided to put less emphasis on the
ethics of advocacy, with which ninety-five percent of the relevant
literature deals, and concentrate on the relatively neglected subject
of the ethics of counseling, particularly the work the lawyer does in
his office as advisor to men of affairs.
This is not to say that the all-out partisan ethic is not being
questioned today even on its traditional home grounds, courtroom
advocacy. Thus, there was a stir a few years ago when a writer on
legal ethics suggested that counsel for the defense in a criminal case
may, on occasion, be under an obligation to put a witness on the
stand even though he knows the witness will commit perjury, and
may have a professional duty to cross-examine a prosecution witness
whom he knows to be accurate and truthful in such a way as to
make the witness appear to be mistaken or lying.6 This view was at
once sharply criticized by many judges and lawyers, including Chief
Justice Burger, as an extremist position that pushes the partisan
ethics of advocacy entirely too far.7 Is it simply that we lawyers are
less comfortable than we used to be with the public perception of the
advocate as a hired gun? Or is it, perhaps, that the profession is
beginning to have some long second thoughts about the realities of
6. M.H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 27, 45 (1975).
7. See, e.g., Burger, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense
Personnel: A Judge's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 11, 12 (1966). But see id. at 14-15.
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the adversary system as it operates in the trial courts of the United
States?
Marvin Frankel, one of the most esteemed of United States
district judges, has recently questioned the ethics of advocacy
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility as "too much
committed to contentiousness as a good in itself and too little
devoted to truth . *"... 8 In this vein, Judge Frankel urges that the
bar "consider whether the paramount commitment of counsel
concerning matters of fact should be to the discovery of truth rather
than the advancement of the client's interest,"9 and recommends
that "[t]he rules of professional responsibility should compel
disclosures of material facts [even if adverse to the client's interest]
and forbid material omissions rather than merely proscribe positive
frauds" 10 - as does the Code of Professional Responsibility.11
I happen to share Judge Frankel's conviction that a far better
accommodation is possible, with no serious danger to the adversary
tradition of the common law, between the courtroom lawyer's
partisan loyalty to his client and his responsibilities, as an officer of
the court, to the objectives of truth and justice. But that is not the
subject of this lecture; we are considering not the ethics of advocacy
but the ethical responsibilities of the lawyer in his role as counselor.
So let us assume, for the moment, that the morality of largely
unmitigated partisanship is acceptable in courtroom advocacy and,
on this provisional assumption, move on to the largely neglected
question of the applicability of the lawyer's traditional partisan
ethic to his work outside the courtroom as legal advisor and designer
of transactional structures.
Long before work began on the present Code of Professional
Responsibility, it was already a widely held view in the profession
that the old Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association
12
8. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031,
1052 (1975).
9. Id. at 1055.
10. Id. at 1057.
11. C.P.R., supra note 3, DR 7-102(B). This Disciplinary Rule provides:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a
person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and
if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the
affected person or tribunal, except when the information is protected as a
privileged communication.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
12. The original Canons of Professional Ethics, 32 in number, were adopted by
the ABA in 1908. With amendments and substantial additions (32 supplemental
canons were adopted in 1928), the Canons served as the best available statement of
the standards of the American legal profession until replaced in 1970 by the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
[VOL. 23: p. 597
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 5 [1978], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss5/1
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE
were unduly focused on the ethics of advocacy and, even more
important for most lawyers, gave little help on the moral problem of
office counseling. This was one of the causes that led to the creation,
in the spring of 1952, of a committee called the Joint Conference on
Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association and the
Association of American Law Schools. Ten members, five represent-
ing the American Bar Association and five representing university
law schools, were appointed to the Joint Conference; 13 and, in time,
the Joint Conference submitted a final report,14 which was approved
by the Association of American Law Schools in December, 1958 and
by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association in
February, 1959.
Let us note in passing that the Joint Conference, with quite
minor reservations, put its stamp of approval on the ethics of
partisanship in courtroom advocacy. For example, the final report of
the Joint Conference includes such statements as these:
The lawyer appearing as an advocate before a tribunal
presents, as persuasively as he can, the facts and the law of the
case as seen from the standpoint of his client's interest ....
In a very real sense it may be said that the integrity of the
adjudicative process itself depends upon the participation of the
advocate ....
[ P]artisan advocacy plays a vital and essential role in
one of the most fundamental procedures of a democratic society
Viewed in this light, the role of the lawyer as a partisan
advocate appears not as a regrettable necessity, but as an
indispensable part of a larger ordering of affairs.
15
What I have quoted is certainly enough to demonstrate that the
members of the Joint Conference, practicing lawyers and professors
alike, had no ingrained prejudice against the adversary system and
13. The Co-Chairmen of the Joint Conference were John D. Randall, Esquire, of
Cedar Rapids, Iowa, an outstanding leader of the organized bar, and Professor Lon L.
Fuller of the Harvard Law School. Professor Fuller was the principal draftsman of the
Joint Conference's final report. In the interests of full disclosure, I must record that I
was a member of the Joint Conference and, so, perhaps unduly disappointed that its
report, although well-received at the time, had less influence than it might have had
on the essential contents of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
14. Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility of the American Bar
Association and the Association of American Law Schools, Professional Responsibil-
ity: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Joint
Conference Report].
15. Id. at 1160-61.
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its correlative - the partisan ethics of advocacy. As concerns the
lawyer in court, the report of the Joint Conference is quite consistent
with the Code of Professional Responsibility formulated ten years
later and, indeed, is frequently quoted at length in the Notes to the
advocacy-related provisions of the Code.1'
But a quite different tone emerges when the report of the Joint
Conference on Professional Responsibility moves from "The Law-
yer's Role as Advocate in Open Court" to "The Lawyer's Role as
Counselor." Bear with me as I quote at length from the Joint
Conference Report, because the point we are getting to is, I believe,
of momentous importance:
Although the lawyer serves the administration of justice
indispensably both as advocate and as office counselor, the
demands imposed on him by these two roles must be sharply
distinguished . . . . The reasons that justify and even require
partisan advocacy in the trial of a cause do not grant any license
to the lawyer to participate as legal adviser in a line of conduct
that is immoral, unfair, or of doubtful legality. In saving himself
from this unworthy involvement, the lawyer cannot be guided
solely by an unreflective inner sense of good faith; he must be at
pains to preserve a sufficient detachment from his client's
interests so that he remains capable of a sound and objective
appraisal of the propriety of what his client proposes to do. 17
With an audience like this, I hardly need to go into the reasons
why the lawyer-members and professor-members of the Joint
Conference on Professional Responsibility were agreed that the all-
out partisanship acceptable in courtroom advocacy is not to be
carried over lock, stock and barrel in the performance of the lawyer's
role as counselor. As an advocate in open court, the lawyer faces the
opposition of a presumably equally able and well-prepared advocate
whose counter-partisanship will offset his own. And the proof of
facts and issues of law are contested by the two partisans in the
presence and under the surveillance of an unbiased and presumably
competent judge. Truth, the common law has long believed, best
emerges from the fires of controversy. But when the lawyer is in his
office devising a course of business conduct, a standard form
contract, or a complex scheme of land acquisition and development,
no opposing lawyer is there to represent the equities of the many
persons who may be affected by the lawyer's plans, no judge is
16. See, e.g., C.P.R., supra note 3, Canon 7 nn.5, 24 & 33.
17. Joint Conference Report, supra note 14, at 1161 (emphasis added).
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present to monitor the fairness of the arrangements, and there are
no fires of controversy to keep the counselor honest and purge his
client's specifications of overreaching self-interest. Is there a lawyer
anywhere who has not felt the twinges of ethical uneasiness in so
hidden and ex parte a professional coitext? It was, many of us
thought, a quantum leap in the ethical perceptions of the profession
when the organized bar, as well as the law schools, approved the
Joint Conference's distinction between the ethics of advocacy and
the ethics of counseling.
But funny things can happen on the way to the Forum, and
something did on the journey from the Joint Conference Report of
1958 to the Code of Professional Responsibility of 1969. The
members of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical
Standards who prepared the Code of Professional Rebponsibility had
the report of the Joint Conference before them.18 It is evident from
the drafting of the Code itself that they knew of the section on "The
Lawyer's Role as Counselor" from which I have just quoted.19 The
inescapable inference is that the able people who drew up the Code
of Professional Responsibility considered but rejected the Joint
Conference's carefully stated position that the ethical obligations of
the counselor are quite different from those of the lawyer in open
court and that the lawyer as counselor is under, a duty to appraise
the moral propriety, as well as the legality, of his client's proposed
course of action. The lawyer as counselor, the Joint Conference had
said, must not "participate as legal adviser in a line of conduct that
18. One of the Special Committee's members, Professor ;A. James Casner of the
Harvard Law School, had been an ABA representative to the Joint Conference on
Professional Responsibility and had participated actively and very usefully in the
Joint Conference's deliberations.
19. This section of the report is quoted at length in a footnote to the Code. See
C.P.R., supra note 3, Canon 7 n.9. And, in fact, one of the Ethical Considerations
begins as if it were going to adopt the Joint Conference distinction between courtroom
lawyers and office counselors, stating: "Where the bounds of the law are uncertain,
the action of a lawyer may depend on whether he is serving as advocate or adviser
.... [T]he two roles are essentially different." Id. EC 7-3. But this distinction has no
ethical consequences in the Code of Professional Responsibility, for Ethical
Consideration 7-3 merely says that the advocate "should resolve in favor of his client
doubts as to the bounds of the law," whereas the adviser "should give his professional
opinion as to what the ultimate decisions of the courts would likely be as to the
applicable law." Id. This is not an ethical injunction but a caution of prudence in the
use of legal sources for counseling purposes. Every first-year law, student learns that
statutes and precedents are to be used differently in advocacy and counseling, i.e.,
that doubtful interpretations are resolved in favor of a client's contention in litigation,
but usually resolved against the client's interest when the counselor is planning a safe
course of conduct for the future. Does Ethical Consideration 7-3 say more than that?
On the legal method point generally, see N. DOWLING, E. PATTERSON & R. POWELL,
MATERIALS FOR LEGAL METHOD 14 (2d. ed. 1952).
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is immoral, unfair, or of doubtful legality." 20 The lawyer as
counselor, says the Code of Professional Responsibility, may help
his client achieve any objective that is "within the bounds of the
law."
21
You will see at once the vast difference between these two
versions of the counselor's moral accountability. Anyone who is not
a super-Austinian positivist knows that there is much immoral and
unfair commercial and social behavior that can be engaged in
without going beyond "the bounds of the law." The first Mr.
Rockefeller's most oppressive tactics were, by and large, within the
bounds of the law; their legality, as carefully tailored by Mr.
Rockefeller's lawyers-advisers, was the very attribute that gave them
their efficacy as instruments of intimidation and oppression. A land
developer undermining the ecology of a wilderness region, a
corporation or labor union setting up a pension plan with only
illusory benefits, or a company management enriching insiders at
the expense of its stockholders does not necessarily engage in illegal
or legally "fraudulent" conduct, 22 certainly not if the legal advisers
20. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
21. C.P.R., supra note 3, EC 7-1. This Ethical Consideration states: "[Tlbe duty of
a lawyer . . . is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law." Id.
(footnote omitted). Does the Code of Professional Responsibility suggest anywhere
that a lawyer acts unethically if he helps a client achieve an objective which,
although "within the bounds of the law," strikes the lawyer as unjust, immoral, or
unfair? If there is any such suggestion, I have been unable to find it. Ethical
Consideration 7-8 may come the closest. For the pertinent text of this Ethical
Consideration, see note 3 supra. But the rather lukewarm language used there -
"often desirable" and "may," rather than "imperative" and "should" - are largely
cancelled out by the next sentence of Ethical Consideration 7-8: "In the final
analysis, however, the lawyer should always remember that the decision whether to
forego legally available objectives or methods because of non-legal factors is
ultimately for the client and not for himself." C.P.R., supra note 3, EC 7-8. If the
client insists on a legal but unjust course of action, the counselor, according to Ethical
Consideration 7-8, "may withdraw from the employment," but there is no suggestion
that he has an ethical obligation to withdraw. Id. (emphasis added). And to the same
effect is Ethical Consideration 7-9, which states: "when an action in the best interest
of his client seems to him to be unjust," a lawyer "may ask his client for permission to
forego such action." Id. EC 7-9 (emphasis added).
It is, I think, a proper reading of the several Ethical Considerations just cited
that the counselor has discretion ("may") to refuse to assist his client in an immoral
or unjust line of conduct but is under a professional duty to refuse only when the
client's objectives or methods are not "within the bounds of the law." On this reading,
which seems inescapable, the Ethical Considerations, even when taken together,
impose no greater ethical duty on the counselor than is imposed by Disciplinary Rule
7-102(A)(7), which forbids a lawyer to "counsel or assist his client in conduct that the
lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent." Id. DR 7-102(A)(7). Textual comparison
confirms this interpretation. When the able draftsmen of the Code of Professional
Responsibility intended to make the justice or fairness of action, rather than the
legality of action, the measure of a lawyer's professional duty, they expressed the idea
clearly and unambiguously. See, e.g., id. EC 7-13 (professional responsibility of a
public prosecutor); id. EC 7-14 (professional responsibility of government lawyers).
22. See C.P.R., supra note 3, DR 7-102(A)(7). For the pertinent text of this
Disciplinary Rule, see note 21 supra.
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are ingenious enough to find weaknesses in the pattern of existing
legal regulation. But who would deny that such conduct, legal or
illegal, is "immoral or unfair" by any definition and so, by the
standards of the Joint Conference, an "unworthy involvement" to be
shunned by a lawyer of conscience?
The contrast in the two competing versions of the counselor's
moral obligation is sharp and clear if we turn again to Case Three,
where the counselor is asked by his client to prepare an oppressive
and inequitable standard form contract. The standard form is
manifestly "unfair" but, as such clauses typically are, "within the
bounds of the law." The lawyer, says the Joint Conference Report, is
not to draft it, even at the risk of losing a financially rewarding
client. The lawyer, says the Code of Professional Responsibility
"may continue in the representation of his client . . . so long as he
does not thereby assist the client to engage in illegal conduct or to
take a frivolous legal position. ' 23 The Code of Professional
Responsibility is sketchy and incomplete in its treatment of the
ethics of counseling, but its essential message, as I read it, is this:
the lawyer as counselor is answerable only for the positive legality,
and not for the fairness and moral propriety, of what he accom-
plishes for the clients he serves.
If this amounts to a backward step, and a very significant one,
in the developing ethics of the legal profession, how are we to
account for it? The members of the Special Committee who drew up
the Code of Professional Responsibility - and in the course of that
project rejected the Joint Conference's distinction in ethical position
between courtroom lawyers and office counselors - were not shady
or crafty people; indeed, I doubt whether the organized bar has ever
in its history assembled a more representative committee or one of
greater professional integrity and distinction. 24 How could they, in
effect, take a position that the lawyer may, without offending the
ethical standards of the profession, put his great skills to the
accomplishment of an immoral or unfair design, provided only that
it does not transgress the existing positive law? The explanation, I
believe, is in something I suggested earlier: that lawyers, even the
ablest and most experienced of them, do not fully realize that the
ethics of all-out partisanship are rooted in adversary courtroom
23. C.P.R., supra note 3, EC 7-5.
24. The Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards included in its
membership a former Justice of the Supreme Court, three former presidents of the
ABA, three members of the ABA Standing Committee on Professional Ethics, and
two of the most highly regarded of American law professors. Throughout the more
than three years of its work, the Special Committee had the assistance of a talented
and scholarly Reporter, Assistant Reporter, and Staff Director.
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procedures and simply cannot be carried over into other contexts
where adversary safeguards - the opposing lawyer and the
overseeing judge - do not exist. When the all-out partisan model is
carried over into the nonadversary aspects of the lawyer's life, it is
as if an offensive lineman of the Pittsburgh Steelers were to use the
strong-arm tactics appropriate in his gridiron employment to get his
family on board a commuter train at a crowded suburban station.
Is it fair to suggest, as I have doing for years, that the lawyer as
counselor must answer in conscience for the social worth as well as
the formal legality of the results he accomplishes in his clients'
service and on their behalf?25 "A lawyer is unduly moralistic,
unbearably self-righteous," some will contend, "if he tries to impose
his different ethical standards on the client he is advising." I am
entirely unpersuaded by this familiar argument. The issue is not
whether the counselor is to thrust his morality gratuitously upon
another person, but whether the counselor is to participate, take an
active and often indispensable part, in the carrying out of what he
considers another's unjust design. The distinction between officious-
ness and nonparticipation is surely clear enough. Suppose, as an
analogy, that a physician has deeply felt moral convictions against
abortion. Many would disagree with his views on the question, but
would anyone consider him gratuitously moralistic, a meddler in
another's moral universe, if he refuses to perform a requested
abortion himself? I do not go about carrying picket signs denouncing
hard-core pornography, but I would not finance a pornographic
picture or share in the profits of its distribution. Would my
participation be different in kind, my ethical uneasiness less, if I
accepted employment as a pornographer's out-of-court legal adviser?
In discussions of professional ethics, as in other disputations,
slogans sometimes masquerade as arguments. One formulation
often heard nowadays is that the lawyer, even when acting not as
advocate but as out-of-court adviser, may and should think of
himself as if he were "my client with a law degree." The point of
this, as I understand it, is that every person in society has a "right"
to choose his own objectives, whatever they may be; and so has a
"right" to have the aid of the lawyer of his choice in devising plans
to accomplish these sought objectives "within the bounds of the
law." From this it follows, or is supposed to, that lawyers, by the
accepted standards of their profession, are socially neutral techni-
25. See, e.g., Jones, Law and Morality in the Perspective of Legal Realism, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 799, 805-07 (1961).
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cians who need not and really should not concern themselves about
the justice of the legal structures they create to their clients'
specifications. But the formula, "my client with a law degree,"
misses what may be the point of it all. The client might be a very
different person in his sensitivity to the perceptions of fairness and
justice in human affairs if he had gone through the long course of
study necessary to win him that postulated law degree. If there is an
external moral standard for the counselor, it is not "my client with a
law degree" but "my client as his values would be if he had studied
law." This is not a quibble; the two standards are profoundly
different. If I did not think them profoundly different, I would have
to conclude that I had wasted my life in the study and teaching of
law.
More pragmatic arguments have been advanced from time to
time in defense of the proposition that the lawyer, even when acting
as counselor and not as advocate in open court, is bound by his
client's judgments of fairness and social desirability rather than by
his own. One contention which has to be taken account of is, in
substance, this: if the moral counselor refuses to do the immoral or
unfair legal job, an immoral lawyer will quickly be found to do it,
and will do it far more unjustly. This argument is hardly flattering
to the bar, but there is, I suppose, something to it; the restraining
influence that good lawyers have had on even their most avaricious
clients is a significant story that should be told far more often than
it is. I know of many instances in which fine lawyers - in Wall
Street, in country practices and in precincts in between - have by
example and force of character dissuaded grasping or insensitive
clients from pursuing technically legal but socially inequitable
courses of action. But the argument that ethically callous lawyers
are always lurking in the wings proves too much; it would also
justify a counselor's aiding a client to violate the law, which even the
present Code of Professional Responsibility forbids.
Does the question of the counselor's ethical accountability come
down, then, to a matter of economics and professional survival? I
have been skirting this issue so far, so let me state it plainly and
with the bark off. If the counselor refuses "unworthy. involvements,"
his clients - so the unexpressed argument runs - will at once leave
him for other less scrupulous legal advisers, and he will soon be
starving to death, or looking for employment in a legal services
office. I doubt this very, very much. Men of large affairs do not select
their legal advisers entirely or principally for ethical insensitivity.
And the argument of survival, if acceptable at all, comes with a little
more grace from a struggling beginning lawyer, or from a fringe
professional like those characterized by Jerome Carlin as Lawyers
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on their Own 26 than from a partner in a top-flight law firm. No
lawyer is hurt very much if his refusal to participate in ethically
unworthy involvements causes his income to drop from $100,000 to
$50,000 dollars a year - this, you see, is one of the advantages of
being a university law teacher; we can be objective about such
variations above our highest conceivable income ceiling.
Serious discussion of the moral dimensions of counseling is
impossible if one blinds oneself to the plain fact that the ethic of all-
out partisanship is a wonderfully convenient arrangement for
lawyers generally. So long as the counselor is thought of, and thinks
of himself, as a pure legal technician, bound by a kind of irrebutable
presumption that whatever his client wants done "within the bounds
of the law" is an ethically justifiable thing to do, the counselor can
undertake many professional tasks, often quite profitable ones, that
he might otherwise hesitate to accept. The circumstance that the
partisan ethic makes it easier for lawyers to justify their choices of
employment to others and to themselves is, of course, no proof
whatever that the partisan model is wrong. The material interest of
physicians is certainly served by the medical ethic that preservation
and prolongation of human life is an ultimate good, but no one
would suggest for a moment that his is a reason for abandoning the
standards of Hippocrates. In law as in medicine, an intraprofes-
sional ethical standard is to be appraised not by its convenience or
inconvenience for practitioners but in terms of the moral and social
justification of the standard itself. If the Code of Professional
Responsibility is to retain the idea of partisanship as the measure of
the counselor's legal obligation, it should be for some far better
reason than that the all-out partisan model enables lawyers to
participate as advisers in morally dubious enterprises without being
criticized for it and without feeling uneasy about it themselves.
VI.
The sands of my lecture time are running out, so what shall we
say now about J.M.L., my revered Sunday School teacher? He of all
men would certainly have felt the strains of the ethics of
partisanship, particularly when he was engaged, as he was most of
the time, in the counselor's role. Did he on occasion give his superb
professional skills to designs he thought of as unworthy? If he did -
and I have no reason to believe that he did - such involvements
would have been bearable for him only because the partisan ethic
26. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN: A STORY OF INDIVIDUAL PRACTITIONERS
IN CHICAGO (1962).
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was an unquestioned "given," something taken for granted, in the
profession of his day. If the professional standard had been stated
differently, as proposed almost two decades ago by the Joint
Conference on Professional Responsibility, J.M.L., whatever others
might have done, would have adhered to it faithfully and, I suspect,
with very considerable emotional relief.
Am I saying, then, that J.M.L. should have practiced law as he
taught Sunday School? As to the intellectual rigor and inescapable
interpersonal toughness of top-flight law practice, of course not. But
in his essential ethical standards, those he proclaimed as a
churchman and by which he governed his own personal affairs, why
should J.M.L.'s practical working morality be higher anywhere else
than in the vocation to which he gave his long life? The word
"vocation" had literal religious significance for people of J.M.L.'s
quality and generation; it was in the profession to which he was
called that a good man had to be at his best. We should not settle for
much less in the Ethical Considerations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which are set out not as minimum standards but as
statements of the aspirations of the bar.
27
The materials of the law - cases, statutes, regulations and the
like - are for the advocate and counselor what pigments and canvas
are for the artist, something to be used for the accomplishment of a
design. Sooner or later the lawyer is answerable, if only to himself,
for the worth of that design. It may be, or so we have assumed for
this lecture, that justice in the settlement of disputes is best served
by preservation of the all-out adversary ethic for courtroom
litigation, although there are grounds for uneasiness even there. But
in the counseling context, where the adversary safeguards are
wholly lacking, the case for the ethics of partisanship becomes very
thin indeed.
The Code of Professional Responsibility, notwithstanding the
hard work of the distinguished committee that produced it, furnishes
far less guidance than it should on the complex and thorny ethical
problems of the out-of-court legal adviser. The ethical considerations
of which the counselor must take account will never be easy to state,
and controversy will surely attend every suggestion that the lawyer
as counselor has moral responsibilities beyond those assigned to him
by the conventional technician-partisan model. But hard as the task
of rethinking and restatement may be, it must be undertaken in the
27. See C.P.R., supra note 3, Preliminary Statement. The Preliminary Statement
declares that "[tihe Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and
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interest of our increasingly lawyer-managed society and in the
interest of the bar itself. It is simply not good enough to declare, as
the Code of Professional Responsibility seems to do, that the only
bounds on what a lawyer can do for his client are "the bounds of the
law." Somehow it must be made plain that the lawyer's moral
judgment is not for hire, that there are occasions when the lawyer as
counselor is under a duty to act as a person of independent ethical
concern with obligations not only to his client's interest but also to
fairness and justice in the management of affairs.
The stated aspirations of the bar should be a step ahead of
prevailing practice. In this instance, the Code of Professional
Responsibility sets the standard far lower than that to which many
lawyers of honor have long and faithfully adhered. There should
have been protest from the bar that the profession was setting its
ethical sights too low, and insistence that the counseling-related
provisions of the Code be reopened for thorough-going reexamina-
tion and far more comprehensive statement. Perhaps, just conceiva-
bly, this expression of regret will, in time, help get some such motion
for reconsideration under way. Only that would make this inaugural
lecture in Villanova's new series worthy of the memory of Donald
Giannella.
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